The Economic Failure Codex

The Economic Failure Codex

143. Credible-Commitment and Time-Inconsistency Failure U2

Family VI. Institutional, Political & Sovereign Capture · EFC-144

SystemInstitution / State; Macroeconomy
DamageCoordination / Resilience; Institutional / Trust; NRV; R_sys
For lay readers“Promises that can't survive the morning”
Key academic—
Exemplarinflation promises broken for short-term employment gain
mechanism The Time-Inconsistency Problem: A steward optimally announces a policy (low inflation, stable rules, honoured contracts), then re-optimises later when conditions change, breaking the promise. Rational actors anticipate the break, so the announced policy is not believed (Kydland and Prescott 1977). suggest edit
mechanism The Credibility Deficit: Without a binding commitment mechanism, every promise is contingent on future re-optimisation. Investment, wage-setting and contracts are made on the expectation of the break, so the steward cannot deliver even what it genuinely intends. suggest edit
balance condition Balance Condition, Discretion and Commitment: Discretion is necessary; a steward must respond to shocks and cannot bind the future absolutely. The pathology begins where the inability to credibly commit deters efficient behaviour, and the fix is commitment devices, not the abolition of discretion. suggest edit
remediation Candidate Interventions / Stewardship Responses: Build credible-commitment institutions (independent central banks, constitutional rules, long-horizon contracting, reputation for keeping promises), so promises survive the temptation to re-optimise. Intervention risk: rigid commitment can prevent necessary response to shocks (see item P75 [Crisis-Window Governance]). suggest edit
for lay readers For Lay Readers: "Promises that can't survive the morning"; key academic: Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1977, Rules Rather than Discretion, Journal of Political Economy); exemplar: inflation promises broken for short-term employment gain. suggest edit
framing prose Distinction from Item P75 [Crisis-Window Governance and Consent Compression]: Crisis-cover rule-breaking vs ordinary time-inconsistency. suggest edit
framing prose R: The commitment gap at global scope. suggest edit

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